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sh>EZ/>/dz ? /ZZ'h>Z D/'ZEd^ ? ,>d,-RELATED RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Sylvie Da Lomba, University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
dŚĞ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ-related rights brings to the fore the tensions 
that exist between human rights, citizenship and the sovereign state, and exposes the 
protection gaps in the international human rights regime. With this in mind, I consider the 
merits of a vulnerability analysis in international human rights law (IHRL). I posit that, 
detached from specific groups and reconceptualised as universal, vulnerability can be 
reclaimed as a foundation and tool of IHRL. I further contend that the deployment of a 
vulnerability analysis can alleviate the exclusionary dimension of IHRL and extend 
protections to irregular migrants. On this basis, I investigate the development of a 
vulnerability analysis in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.  I argue that, in 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?a vulnerability analysis can 
improve protection standards for irregular migrants in the field of health.  
 
Keywords: vulnerability; vulnerable groups; irregular migrants; health-related rights; 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
1. Introduction 
The protection of irregular migrants ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ-related rights brings to the fore the tensions 
that exist between human rights, citizenship and the sovereign state,
1
 and exposes the gaps 
in the international human rights regime. ,ĞĂůƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůŐŽŽĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐǀĂůƵĞ ?2
and as such is recognised as a basic human right.
3
 Yet international human rights law (IHRL) 
ŚĂƐ ďǇ ĂŶĚ ůĂƌŐĞ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŶĞĞĚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ŽĨ
health. In particular, IHRL has done little to counter receiving stĂƚĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ
ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?4 I attribute these failings of IHRL to its inability to 
                                                            
1
 B. S. Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
University Presses, 2006) p. 2 and p. 89. 
2
 > ? ĞƌŶŝĞƌ ?  “/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐŽĐŝŽ-economic human rights: the key to global health 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?The International Journal of Human Rights 14(2) (2010) 246-279, p. 249. 
3
 The right to health is enshrined in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 
entry into force 3 January 1976). For a comprehensive analysis of the content of the right to 
health, see B.C.A., Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law, 
(Antwerpen: Intersentia, 1999) pp. 243-289. 
4
 ^ ?Ă>ŽŵďĂ ?  “/ŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚďĂƐŝĐ ƐŽĐŝĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ PĂĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƚƵĚǇŽĨ
ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĐĂƌĞ ŝŶ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ? ƚŚĞ h<ĂŶĚ ĂŶĂĚĂ ? ?Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 28(1) (2010) 6-40.  
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recognise non-citizens as fully-fledged IHRL subjects on account of their immigration status 
and ensuing lack of membership in the receiving state. While irregular migration covers a 
range of situations including clandestine arrival in the receiving state, stay beyond the 
permitted period of residence,5 and refused asylum claim,6 irregular migrants have in 
common that their immigration status places them outside the national community of the 
receiving state.  
 
With this in mind, I explore the merits of a vulnerability analysis in IHRL. Importantly, 
vulnerability in this context is reconceptualised as universal
7
 and is therefore shared by all 
human beings.
8
 More specifically, I investigate whether the development of a vulnerability 
analysis in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can improve 
protection standards under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the field 
of health for irregular migrants.
9
 There are four reasons for focusing on the ECHR. First, 
ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?access to basic social rights has been identified as a particular cause for 
concern in Europe.10 Secondly, while the rights enshrined in the ECHR are in the main civil 
and political, the Convention can apply to socio-economic conditions.11 Thirdly, the ECHR is 
central to the European human rights system. Finally and importantly, it follows from Article 
1 ECHR that irregular migrants present in States Parties to the Convention can avail 
themselves of its protection.12 This is a critical point as irregular migrants commonly fall 
outside the protection of the law on account of their immigration status.13  
 
                                                            
5
 Elspeth 'ƵŝůĚ ? “tŚŽŝƐĂŶ/ƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌDŝŐƌĂŶƚ ? ?ŝŶ P ?ŽŐƵƐǌ ?Z ?ŚŽůĞǁŝŶƐŬŝ ? ?ǇŐĂŶĂŶĚ ?
Szyszczak (eds.), Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and 
International Perspectives (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) pp. 3-28, p. 3. 
Irregular migration also covers working without a permit or in a manner inconsistent with 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ibid.). 
6
 ^ ? Ă >ŽŵďĂ ?  “/ƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĐĂƌĞ P Ă ĐĂƐĞ-study of 
health-ĐĂƌĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ? ?International Journal of 
Law in Context 7(Special issue 03) (2011) 357-374, p. 357. The term irregular migrant also 
applies to foreign nationals who enter on false papers and regularised migrants who fall 
back into an irregular situation (ibid.). 
7
 D ? ?&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ? “dŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ PĂŶĐŚŽƌŝŶŐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?Yale 
Journal of Law & Feminism 20(1) (2008) 1-23, p. 1.    
8
 B. S. Turner, supra note 1, p. 1. 
9
 European Convention on Human Rights, CETS No. 005, 4 November 1950, entry into force 
3 September 1953. 
10
 R. Cholewinski, Study on Obstacles to Effective Access of Irregular Migrants to Minimum 
Social Rights (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, December 2005). 
11
 European Court of Human Rights, Airey v. Ireland, App. no. 6289/73, Judgment of 9 
October 1979, para 26. 
12
 ƌƚŝĐůĞ ?,ZƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ,ŝŐŚŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐWĂƌƚŝĞƐƐŚĂůůƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŽĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƐ ? Q ? ?ƐĞƚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞ,Z ? ? ?
13
 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, CommDH/IssuePaper (2007) 1, The 
Human Rights of Irregular Migrants in Europe, 17 Dec. 2007.  
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The concept of vulnerability has gained momentum in IHRL and the international human 
rights regime confers specific protection on groups deemed vulnerable. However, having 
established that the vulnerable group approach struggles to bring irregular migrants under 
the protection of IHRL, I consider the concept of universal vulnerability. I posit that, 
detached from specific groups, vulnerability can be reclaimed as a foundation and tool of 
IHRL. I further contend that the deployment of a vulnerability analysis can alleviate the 
exclusionary dimension of IHRL and extend protections to irregular migrants. On this basis, I 
ĞǆƉůŽƌĞ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƉůĂǇƐ ŽƵƚ ŝŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚ-related 
cases involving migrants with precarious immigration statuses. In particular, I examine how 
the Court diƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŝŶǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ? ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ. Having shown 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĞƌŽĚĞƐ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ standards, notably under Article 3 ECHR, I 
ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁĐĂŶimprove 
protection standards for irregular migrants in the field of health.  
 
2. Vulnerable Groups,  International Human Rights Protection and Irregular Migrants 
In this section, I argue that the concept of vulnerable group in IHRL exposes rather than 
addresses the protection gaps in the international human rights regime, with the 
consequence that, by and large, irregular migrants remain outside the protection of IHRL. 
 
2.1. Vulnerable Groups in IHRL 
 
IHRL grants specific protection to groups who are singled out on the basis of their 
vulnerability. Protection is conferred through population-specific instruments such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
14
 the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
15
 or the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
16
 This phenomenon is sometimes 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉůƵƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ /,Z> ?17 The need to protect vulnerable groups is also a 
recurrent theme in the work of human rights treaty bodies,
18
 including judicial bodies such 
as the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
19
 The concept of vulnerable 
                                                            
14
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990. 
15
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General 
Assembly resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 January 1969. 
16
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, General 
Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979, entry into force 3 September 1981. 
17
 & ? DĠŐƌĞƚ ?  “dŚĞ ŝƐĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ P ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ Žƌ
disability rights ? ? ?,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇ 30 (2008) 494-516, p. 495. 
18
  ? Z ? ŚĂƉŵĂŶ ?  ? ĂƌďŽŶĞƚƚŝ ?  “,ƵŵĂŶ ƌights protections for vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups: the contributions of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
ƵůƚƵƌĂůZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?Human Rights Quarterly 33 (2011) 682-732. 
19
 For example, in Furlan and Family v. Argentina, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 ‘ƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞ ?Ě ?ƚŚĂƚĂŶǇƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽŝƐŝŶĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?- in this instance a child with 
disabilities - ? ?ǁĂƐ ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?I/A Court H.R., Case of Furlan and Family 
v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 
2012. Series C No. 246, para. 134).  
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group assumes shared characteristics among members that set them apart from the general 
population and places them at a greater disadvantage.
20
 sƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ĐŽŵŵŽŶ
characteristics may relate to their identity; racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, the elderly 
and persons with disabilities have been cast vulnerable on this basis.
21
 dŚĞ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?
(assumed) characteristics may also pertain to their socio-economic, immigration or health 
status. Accordingly, migrant workers, prisoners and persons living with HIV-AIDS have been 
found to constitute vulnerable groups.
22
 These two categories of characteristics are not 
mutually exclusive and groups can be considered vulnerable on the basis of both identity 
and status-based criteria.
23
 However, in the absence of a coherent set of criteria, what 
exactly makes a group vulnerable remains unclear as the case law of the ECtHR shows.
24
  
 
Moreover, the construction of groups as vulnerable is not without problems. There is not 
sufficient space to comprehensively discuss the flaws in the vulnerable group approach, but 
these may be outlined. First, because it assumes the existence of cohesive groups, the 
vulnerable population approach can obscure significant differences between members
25
 
while concealing similarities between members and the wider population.
26
 Thus, the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉĐĂŶďĞ ‘ďŽƚŚŽǀĞƌ- and under- ŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ? ?27 Secondly, because it 
closely links vulnerability to notions of harm and suffering,
28
 this concept comes with 
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚĞŶĞƌŽĚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?29 For instance, the construction 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
20
 DĂƌƚŚĂůďĞƌƚƐŽŶ&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ? “ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞsƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ^ƵďũĞĐƚŝŶ>ĂǁĂŶĚ
WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ŝŶ P D ? ? &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ  ? 'ƌĞĂƌ  ?ĞĚƐ ? ? ?Vulnerability, Reflections on a New Ethical 
Foundation for Law and Politics (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2013) pp. 13-26, p. 16.  
21
 See A. R. Chapman, B. Carbonetti, supra note18, p. 706.  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., p. 707. 
24
 See section 4 of this article. 
25
 Martha Albertson Fineman, supra ŶŽƚĞ  ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ?ĂŶĚ> ?WĞƌŽŶŝ ? ?dŝŵŵĞƌ ?  “sƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ
ŐƌŽƵƉƐ PƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨĂŶĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ? ?
International Journal of Constitutional Law 11(4) (2013) 1056-1085, p. 1071. 
26
 Martha Albertson Fineman, supra note 20, p. 16. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 For example, women have been constructed as a vulnerable group on the basis of harm 
caused by historical experiences of discrimination. CEDAW emphasises that "extensive 
discrimination against women continues to exist" (Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, supra note 16, Preamble). Similarly, children have 
been cast vulnerable on account of their inherent dependency on others that makes them 
more susceptible to harm. The ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞZŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝůĚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?
by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ůĞŐĂů ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ďĞĨŽƌĞ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ďŝƌƚŚ ?  ?Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, supra note 14, Preamble).  
29
 L. Peroni, A. Timmer, supra note 25, p. 1073-1074; and Mary Keogh, Noelin Fox, Eilionóir 
&ůǇŶŶ ?  “,Žǁ &Ăƌ dŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?  sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ƉƌƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ŽĨ ŝƐĂďůĞĚ
WĞŽƉůĞ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? h tŽƌŬŝŶŐ WĂƉĞƌƐ ŝŶ >Ăǁ ? ƌŝŵŝŶology & Socio-Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 29/2010. Retrieved 15 March 2014,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1634806. 
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of asylum seekers as a vulnerable group in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (M.S.S.) overlooks 
their own sources of resilience.
30
 The vulnerable group approach can also stigmatise and 
stereotype populations. For example, in D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, the ECtHR 
questioned the capacity of all Roma parents to perform their parental duty on account of 
their vulnerability as a group.
31
  Thirdly, the vulnerable group approach can prove 
paternalistic in that it requires individuals to identify with a disadvantaged group when they 
may not recognise themselves as members of this group. For instance, Keogh, Fox and Flynn 
ŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?ŵ ?ŽƐƚ ĚŝƐĂďůĞĚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ŶŽƚ ĂƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ Ă ǀƵůnerable group.32 The risk of paternalism also arises 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŶĞĞĚƐŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?33 Fourthly, because 
it is context-specific, the vulnerable group approach is inherently exclusionary.
34
 For 
example, in Horie v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that New Travellers could not be 
considered a vulnerable group and therefore be afforded the same level of protection as 
vulnerable ŶŽŵĂĚŝĐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞǇůŝǀĞ ?Ě ?ĂŶŽŵĂĚŝĐ ůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
choice and not ŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨďĞŝŶŐďŽƌŶŝŶƚŽĂŶǇĞƚŚŶŝĐŽƌĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?35 The vulnerable 
group approach can cause resentment on the part of excluded populations as well as set 
protected groups as competitors.
36
 Lastly and importantly, being cast vulnerable does not 
necessarily mean greater protection for the groups concerned. For example, FitzGerald 
points out that the categorisation of female trafficked migrants as a vulnerable group 
 ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨŽƌĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂƌǇƚĂĐƚŝĐƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽ keep geo-
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƵƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?37  
 
Opinions on how the recognition of vulnerable groups in IHRL and the ensuing pluralization 
of IHRL sit with its universal premise are divided. For some, this development does not 
challenge the universality ŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ŝƚƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƐŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŐƌŽƵƉƐ
ŽƌĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĂƐǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?38 Others - 
and I share their view  W contend that population-specific human rights instruments are 
manifestations of the failures of IHRL to protect the most vulnerable. Grear points out that 
                                                            
30
 European Court of Human Rights [GC], M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. no. 30696/09, 
Judgment of 21 January 2011. 
31
 European Court of Human Rights [GC], D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, App. no. 
57325/00, Judgment of 13 November 2007, para. 203. 
32
 Supra note 29. 
33
 See e.g., A. B. Kaplan,  “Father doesn't always know best: rejecting paternalistic expansion 
of ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƚŽĐůĂŝŵƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐǁŝƚŚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĐƚ ? ?Dickinson 
Law Review 106(2) (fall 2001) 389-414. 
34
 M. A. Fineman, supra note 7, p. 8; and Martha Albertson Fineman, supra note 20, p. 14. 
Fineman makes this point in the context of the US approach to equality. 
35
 European Court of Human Rights, Horrie v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 31845/10, 
Decision on admissibility 1 February 2011, paras. 28 and 29. 
36
 Martha Albertson Fineman, supra note  ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ
made in the context of the US approach to equality, these are relevant beyond the US 
context and anti-discrimination laws and policies. 
37
 ^ ?  ? &ŝƚǌ'ĞƌĂůĚ ?  “ŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ P ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨĞŵĂůĞ
ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬĞĚŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ? ?International Journal of Law in Context 6(3) (2010), 277-294, p. 279. 
38
 F. Mégret, supra note 17, p. 495. 
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 ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞcontemporary human rights movement is profoundly conscious of such exclusions and 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůŽŐŝĐ ŽĨ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐŵ ? ?39 Grear attributes the 
failures of IHRL to its inherently exclusionary nature. Exclusion stems from the centrality of 
the liberal subject in IHRL. The human rights universal is shaped by the liberal rights theory 
with the consequence that the IHRL subject is an abstract legal subject who is 
invulnerable.
40
 Because the IHRL subject is detached from the real human embodied 
subject,
41
 /,Z> ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŬĞǇ ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ
ĞŵďŽĚŝŵĞŶƚƐ  ?ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝƐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?42 This in turn explains the protection gaps in 
the international human rights regime. 
 
2.2. Irregular Migrants and Protection Gaps in IHRL 
 
Grear points out that  ‘ ?Ă ?ůů ƚŽŽ ŽĨƚĞŶ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ůĂǁ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ĨĂŝůƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ
humanity in its most exposed position beyond the outer margins of any given political 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?43 dŚĞĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ ŝŶ /,Z> PƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞ
conferred on persons as human beings; yet IHRL assumes that the universal subject enjoys 
some degree of membership in the nation-state. ConsequentlǇ ?  ‘ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ
adoption of the universal language by many actors, including States, there remains a gap 
between the promise of human rights for all, and the reality of discrimination and abjection 
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇĨĂĐĞĚďǇŵĂŶǇŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ?44 Dembour and <ĞůůǇƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚŝƐŐĂƉŝƐŶŽƚŝĐĞĂďůĞ
ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĂůůƌŝŐŚƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŝŶŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁ ? ?45 The question of human 
rights for irregular migrants brings to the fore the tensions that exist between sovereign 
states, citizenship and human rights
46
; these tensions are particularly acute in the social 
domain. IHRL confers rights  W including social rights - on irregular migrants as human beings; 
yet their immigration status significantly constrains the realisation of their human rights. 
This is because states perceive irregular migrants as a threat to both their power to control 
ƚŚĞŝƌ ďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƐĞůĨ-determination.47 States object to 
the idea of social rights for these migrants because their immigration status locates them 
outside the national community.
48
 dǁŽĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ PĨŝƌƐƚ ?ƚŚĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ
of the welfare state means that the distribution of limited national resources to non-citizens 
is increasingly set against national priorities;
49
 secondly, states take the view that welfare 
                                                            
39
 A. Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) p. 104. 
40
 Ibid., p. 43. 
41
 Ibid., pp. 96-113. 
42
 Ibid., p. 126. 
43
 Ibid., p. 151. 
44
 Marie-ĠŶĠĚŝĐƚĞ ĞŵďŽƵƌ ? dŽďŝĂƐ <ĞůůǇ ?  “/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝŶ PD ? ? ĞŵďŽƵƌ ĂŶĚ d ? <ĞůůǇ 
(eds), Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants 
in Europe and the United States (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1-6, p. 3. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 B. S. Turner, supra note 1, p. 2 and p. 89. 
47
  ?ĂƵǀĞƌŐŶĞ ? “^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁŝŶŐůŽďĂůƚŝŵĞƐ ? ?Modern Law 
Review, 67(4) (2004) 588-615, p. 601. 
48
 S. Da Lomba, supra note 6. 
49
 Ibid., p. 369. 
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provision for irregular migrants encourages irregular migration
50
. Curtailments on health 
care provision for irregular migrants exemplify the tensions between sovereign states, 
citizenship and human rights.
51
 These tensions are also apparent in the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (Migrant Workers Convention).
52
 The Convention seeks to respond to the specific 
protection needs of migrant workers as a vulnerable group.
53
 However, while the Migrant 
Workers Convention confers basic social rights on irregular migrants, enhanced social rights 
are only granted to regular migrants.
54
  The state-centred nature of IHRL explains the 
significance accorded to migƌĂŶƚ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? /,Z> ĨŽƌŵƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ
international law and as such is profoundly shaped by two recurrent principles of 
international law: ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƚƐƵƉĞƌŶŽƌŵ ? ?55 ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƌŽůĞ
in the creation, implementation and enforcement of international law, and national 
sovereignty.
56
 It follows from the state-centred nature of IHRL that the government 
immigration power has a significant bearing on its normative content. IHRL has, at times, 
been successful in counterinŐ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽĐƵƌƚĂŝů ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ, 
notably in the social sphere. For example, in International Federation of Human Rights 
Leagues (FIDH) v. France, the European Committee of Social Rights found that, by depriving 
irregular migrants ?children from immediate access to health care, France had fallen short of 
its obligations under Article 17 of the revised Social Charter (right of children and young 
persons to social, legal and economic protection).
57
 However, such positive developments 
cannot of themselves bring irregular migrants to the fore of IHRL protections.  
  
It follows from the above that two factors inhibit protection for irregular migrants in IHRL. 
First, the construction of the IHRL subject as an invulnerable abstract legal subject means 
                                                            
50
 Ibid., p. 367 and p. 370. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990, entry 
into force 1 July 2003. 
53
 dŚĞ ƉƌĞĂŵďůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ DŝŐƌĂŶƚ tŽƌŬĞƌƐ ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĚƌĂǁƐ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
vulnerability in which migrant workers and members of their families frequently find 
themselves owing, among other things, to their absence from their State of origin and to the 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĞǇ ŵĂǇ ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?
(ibid.). 
54
 Ibid., respectively Parts III and IV.  
55
 A. ƵĐŚĂŶĂŶ ?  “&ƌŽŵ EƵƌĞŵďƵƌŐ ƚŽ <ŽƐŽǀŽ P ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŝůůĞŐĂů ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ůĞŐĂů
ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?Ethics 111(4) (2001) 673-705, p. 688. 
56
 Saladin Meckled-'ĂƌĐşĂ ?ĂƐĂŬĂůŝ ? “,ƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ>ĞŐĂůŝǌĞĚ W Defining, Interpreting and 
/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ /ĚĞĂů ? ? ŝŶ P ^ ? DĞĐŬůĞĚ-García & B. Çali (eds.), The Legalization of Human 
Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human Rights Law (London/New 
York: Routledge, 2005) pp. 1 W31, pp. 17-18. 
57
 European Committee of Social Rights, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues 
(FIDH) v. France, 7 October 2004, Collective complaint No. 14/2003. For an analysis of this 
decision, see S. Da Lomba, supra note 6, p. 371-372. See also European Committee of Social 
Rights, Defence for Children International (DCI) v The Netherlands, 20 October 2009, 
Collective complaint No 47/2008. 
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that IHRL is ill-equipped to address lived vulnerability. Secondly, it follows from the state-
ĐĞŶƚƌĞĚ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ /,Z> ƚŚĂƚ ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƐ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? Ɛ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ƚǇƉŝĨǇ  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛ  “KƚŚĞƌƐ ?58 and the concept of vulnerable group has 
done little to bring them under the protection of IHRL. However, I contend that, 
notwithstanding the failings of IHRL, all may not be lost for irregular migrants and IHRL. In 
the next section, I draw on the work Fineman and Turner and posit that the concept of 
vulnerability can be reclaimed as a foundation and tool of IHRL with a view to alleviating 
protection gaps.  
 
3. Vulnerability as a Foundation and Tool of IHRL 
Drawing on the work of Fineman and Turner, I posit that the concept of vulnerability may be 
reclaimed as a foundation and tool of IHRL. I further argue that the deployment of a 
vulnerability analysis can alleviate protection gaps in the international human rights regime, 
notably in respect of irregular migrants. 
3.1. &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐsƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐ 
 
ƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌĞ ŽĨ &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝƐ Ă ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ƌĞďƵƚƚĂů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŝďĞƌĂů ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
construction of the human subject as an independent and invulnerable actor.
59
 Fineman 
convincingly posits that the vulnerable subject must replace the liberal subject.
60
 She 
ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ğ ?ǀĞƌǇĂĐƚƵĂůŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐ ?ŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶĚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŚĞŽƌƐŚĞ
may seem, is both presently and has been in the past reliant on others and on social 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?61 Vulnerability is unĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ? ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?62 Thus, vulnerability is no longer seen as an exceptional affliction that 
ŽŶůǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ůŝǀĞ ƵƉ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůŝďĞƌĂů ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĞĐĂƵƐĞ
vulnerability is no longer context-specific, a vulnerability analysis escapes most of the pitfalls 
that come with constructing vulnerable groups.
63
 A vulnerability analysis is inclusive rather 
ƚŚĂŶĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂƌǇĂŶĚ ?ďĞůŽǁ ?/ŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĨƌĞĞƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĨƌŽŵŶĞŐĂtive 
connotations such as harm. / ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĂƚ &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚtotally 
eradicate the risk of paternalistic state responses to our shared vulnerability and that 
awareness of this potential drawback is critical to its effective deployment. However, in my 
view, her vulnerability theory significantly reduces the risk of paternalism because it does 
not rest on the construction of vulnerable groups.  Moreover, the recognition that 
vulnerability is also generative, as explained below, further minimises this risk.  
 
Importantly, Fineman recognises that vulnerability is also particular. She emphasises that 
ǁĞ  ‘ŚĂǀĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ ĞŵďŽĚŝŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĂůƐŽ ĂƌĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǁĞďƐ ŽĨ
                                                            
58
 ůĞǆĂŶĚƌĂ dŝŵŵĞƌ ?  “ YƵŝĞƚ ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ P sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĂŶ
ZŝŐŚƚƐ ? ? ŝŶ P D ?  ? &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ  ? 'ƌĞĂƌ  ?ĞĚƐ ? ? ?Vulnerability, Reflections on a New Ethical 
Foundation for Law and Politics (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2013) pp. 147-170, p. 162.  
59
 M. A. Fineman, supra note 7, pp. 10-12. 
60
 Ibid.  
61
 D ? ? &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?  “ůĚĞƌůǇ ? ĂƐ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ P ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĂŶĚ ƐŽcietal 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?The Elder Law Journal 20(2) (2012) 71-112, p. 88. 
62
 M. A. Fineman, supra note 7, p. 1.    
63
 These pitfalls are outlined in Section 2 of this article. . 
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ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? ?64 dŚƵƐ ? ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ  ‘ŝƐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ ƵŶŝƋƵĞůǇ ďǇ
each of us and this experience is greatly influenced by the quality and quantity of resources 
ǁĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŽƌĐĂŶĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ? ?65 The conceptualisation of vulnerability as both universal and 
particular, in my opiniŽŶ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉŽŝŶƚƚŽĂƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŝŶ&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?KŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?
her analysis captures lived vulnerability in all its diversity.  
 
Significantly, Fineman argues that the affirmation of the universal subject calls for a 
responsive state. She notes that  ‘ŝƚŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞŐĂŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚ ? ĂŵĞůŝŽƌĂƚĞ ? ƐĂƚŝƐĨǇ ? ĂŶĚ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ŽƵƌǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?66 Whether we 
ĐĂŶĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŚĞƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐǁĞŶĞĞĚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶŽƵƌ ‘ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶǁĞďƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂů ?ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?
political, and ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?67  ‘ ?tĞ ?
are [therefore] dependent not only on each other but also on the institutions and political 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ǁĞ ?ďƵŝůĚ ? ?68  dŚŝƐ ?ŝŶ&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ĐĂůůƐĨŽƌĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞlationship 
between the state and its institutions, and the individual with a view to making the state 
 ‘ŵŽƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞƚŽ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ ?ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?69 Fineman recognises that societal 
institutions cannot eradicate vulnerability and acknowledges that institutions are 
themselves vulnerable.
70
  ‘^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚ ƚŽ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐnot 
invulnerability, for that is impossible to achieve, but rather the resilience that comes from 
having some means with which to address and confront misfortƵŶĞ ? ?71 
 
3.2. Vulnerability and IHRL 
Fineman does not envisage vulnerability as a human rights concept. She contends that, in 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚǁŝƚŚĂŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞhuman part, 
rather than the rights ƉĂƌƚ ? ?72  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽŶdƵƌŶĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ƉŽƐŝƚƚŚĂƚǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ
can develop as a foundation and tool of IHRL, thereby addressing &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ŵŝƐŐŝǀŝŶŐƐ
ĂďŽƵƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? dƵƌŶĞƌ ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ
recognizes the obviously corporeal dimension of existence; it describes the condition of 
sentient, embodied creatures who are open to the dangers of their environment and are 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?73 He ƐŚĂƌĞƐ&ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ
is both universal and particular.
74
 However, in contrast with Fineman, Turner does not 
recognise the generative nature of vulnerability and closely associates this concept with 
suffering.
75
 &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ĂĐĐĞƉƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĐĂŶ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ  ‘ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ ? Žƌ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů Žƌ
                                                            
64
 D ?  ? &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ?  “dŚĞ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?Emory Law journal 
60(2) (2010-11) 251-275, p. 269. 
65
 M. A. Fineman, supra note 7, p. 10.  
66
  M.A. Fineman, supra note 61, p. 98. 
67
 Ibid., p. 99. 
68
 Ibid., p. 98. 
69
 M. A. Fineman, supra note 7, p. 13. 
70
 Ibid., p. 12. 
71
 M. A. Fineman, supra note 64, p. 269. 
72
 Ibid., p. 255. 
73
 B. S. Turner, supra note 1 p. 28 
74
 Ibid., p. 108. 
75
 Ibid., p. 26. 
European Journal of Health Law 21(4) (2014) 339-364  Accepted Author Manuscript 
    
 
10 
 
emotŝŽŶĂů ĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ? ?76 but she warns against reducing vulnerability to harm and equating 
vulnerability to weakness.
77
 &ŝŶĞŵĂŶ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽƵƌ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ  ?ĂůƐŽ ? ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚs 
opportunities for innovation and growth, creativity, and fulfilment. It makes us reach out to 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ĨŽƌŵ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? ĂŶĚ ďƵŝůĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?78 In my view, the focus on harm and 
ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ƌŝƐŬƐ ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ƚŽ Ă ŚĞůƉůĞƐƐ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? Ă  ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ? ŽĨ ŚĞƌ
embodiment and circumstances; as noted above, this concern is commonly raised in 
relation to the vulnerable group approach.
79
 Importantly, to acknowledge the generative 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞĂůǁĂǇƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨresilience in the 
ĨĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?80  
dƵŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ  ‘ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ ŚƵŵĂŶ
ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?81 profoundly alters the nature of the IHRL subject; it establishes the vulnerable 
subject, namely the human subject, as the IHRL subject. I posit that the recognition of the 
vulnerable subject gives substance to the universal premise of IHRL in that it firmly 
establishes real human beings as the focus of the international human rights regime. Turner 
emphasises that, as vulnerable subjects, we need collective arrangements, including human 
rights protection.
82
 Because the invulnerable liberal subject is replaced by the vulnerable 
human subject, human rights protections can be extended to the most vulnerable.  With the 
affirmation of the universal subject, irregular migrants are no longer constructed as 
 ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛ “KƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?83 However, this does not mean that a vulnerability analysis can fully 
disentangle protection for irregular migrants from the exercise of the government 
immigration power.  This is because the deployment of a vulnerability analysis cannot 
obviate the state-centred nature of IHRL. What the development of a vulnerability analysis 
ŝŶ/,Z>ĐĂŶĚŽ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƐ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƚŽŵĞĞƚĐ ƌƚĂŝŶŵŝŶŝŵƵŵĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?84 
in respect of irregular migrants on account of their vulnerable humanity.  Significantly, a 
vulnerability analysis gives international human rights bodies a critical role in making IHRL 
ŵŽƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĞƐĞďŽĚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ
a potent tool for the identification of human rights obligations that make IHRL subjects 
more resilient to their vulnerabilities. Accordingly, a vulnerability analysis can underpin the 
recognition of human rights obligations that ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĞǆĐůƵĚĞ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ
migrants from distributive arrangements such as health care systems. Below, I investigate 
how a vulnerability analysis can, to an extent, turn the ECtHR into an asset-conferring 
institution that can assist ECHR subjects, including irregular migrants, in building resilience. 
                                                            
76
 M.A. Fineman, supra note 61, p. 96. 
77
 Ibid ? 'ƌĞĂƌ ĂůƐŽ ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞĚ ĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ? ? ?'ƌĞĂƌ ?supra note 39, p. 133). 
78
 M.A. Fineman, supra note 61, p. 96. 
79
 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?<ĞŽŐŚ ?&ŽǆĂŶĚ&ůǇŶŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ “ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?
ƌĞĂĚ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ĐĂŶ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŐŝĐ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶ
disability, which are largely driven from a charity perspective and in return dehumanise and 
ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĞĚŝƐĂďůĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ? (Mary Keogh, Noelin Fox, Eilionóir Flynn, supra note 29).  
80
 L. Peroni, A. Timmer, supra note 25, p. 1074. 
81
 B. S. Turner, supra note 1, p. 1. 
82
 Ibid., p. 10, emphasis added. 
83
 Alexandra Timmer, supra note 58, p. 162.  
84
 B. S. Turner, supra note 1, p. 110. 
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Some take the view that vulnerability is ill-suited to human rights because this concept is 
essentially relevant to social and economic rights  W such as the right to health - because 
these are the rights which are designed to protect us against our embodied vulnerability.
85
 
Turner dismisses this argument on the ground that social and economic rights cannot be 
enjoyed without civil and political rights.
86
 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? / ĐŽŶĐƵƌ ǁŝƚŚ 'ƌĞĂƌ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ
vulnerability offers a more all-embracing theoretical foundation for humĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?87 in that it 
acknowledges that some civil and political rights are deeply linked to our vulnerability.
88
 This 
goes to the core of my argument in favour of the development of a vulnerability analysis in 
ƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ? 
 
4. The ECtHR, Vulnerable Groups and Protection in the Field of Health: Distinguishing 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘sulnerable Migrants ?ĂŶĚ ‘Invulnerable MigrantƐ ?. 
/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?/ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐŝŶM.S.S.89 and N v. the United Kingdom (N 
v. UK)
90
 to explore how the concept of vulnerable group plays out in health-related cases 
involving migrants with precarious immigration statuses.
91
 /ƉŽƐŝƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ
ƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚies are set against concerns over national resources and 
immigration control, with the consequence that protection standards in the field of health 
are lowered for this population.  
4.1. dŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶD ?^ ?^ ?
 
The applicant in M.S.S. was an Afghan asylum seeker who had entered the EU through 
Greece where he was detained and then released before making his way to Belgium. He was 
subsequently returned to Greece by the Belgian authorities pursuant to the Dublin II 
Regulation.
92
 Both Greece and Belgium were found in breach of Article 3 on account of the 
appůŝĐĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ 'ƌĞĞĐĞ ?93 For the first time, the ECtHR 
accepted that Article 3 was capable of having extraterritorial effect when applied to socio-
economic circumstances.
94
 ^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇǁĂƐ ĨĂĐƚŽƌĞd into the 
ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ 'ƌĞĞĐĞ ĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ
                                                            
85
 Ibid., p.  36. 
86
 Ibid., p.  37. 
87
 Grear, supra note 39, p. 135. 
88
 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
89
 Supra note 30.  
90
 European Court of Human Rights [GC], N v. the United Kingdom, App no. 26565/05, 
Judgment of 27 May 2008. 
91
 For a comprehensive analysis of the ECt,Z ?ƐĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐĞĞ P> ?
Peroni, A. Timmer, supra note 25; and Alexandra Timmer, supra note 58. 
92
 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
93
 Supra note 30, paras 233-23, paras. 263-264, and paras. 367-368. 
94
 &ŽƌĂĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ ƚŚĞƚ,Z ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŝŶM.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 
ƐĞĞ ' ? ůĂǇƚŽŶ ?  “ƐǇůƵŵ ƐĞĞŬĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ P D ?^ ?^ ? ǀ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ĂŶĚ 'ƌĞĞĐĞ ?, (2011) 11(4) 
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treatment contrary to Article 3.  The ECtHR held that, as an asylum seeker, the applicant was 
Ă ŵĞŵďĞƌ ŽĨ  ‘Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ group in need of 
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?95 dŚĞŽƵƌƚŽƉŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƐǇůƵŵƐĞĞŬĞƌƐ ?ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƐƚĞŵŵĞĚ
from their dependency on state support to meet their basic needs, including health care.
96
 
In keeping with its emerging case law on the concept of vulnerable group, the ECtHR closely 
links vulnerability to harm. In its early articulation of the concept of vulnerable group, the 
ŽƵƌƚ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŚĂƌŵ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ? ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ
ƐƚŝŐŵĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?97 Accordingly, the Court has found that members of the Roma community 
and persons with mental disabilities constitute vulnerable groups.
98
 More recently, the 
ŽƵƌƚŚĂƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽƵƐĞ ‘ŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů
ĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?99 Groups considered vulnerable on this basis include, in addition to asylum 
seekers, persons in detention,
100
 ĂŶĚ  ‘ǁŽŵĞŶ ŝŶ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ Žƌ ƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ
ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞŚĞĂůƚŚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?.101  
 
4.2. dŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶEǀ ?h< 
 
In N v. UK, a refused asylum seeker who was HIV-positive claimed that her deportation to 
Uganda would violate Article 3 because she would not have access to the treatment she 
needed there. In D v. the United Kingdom (D v. UK), the Court held that the deportation of a 
terminally ill HIV patient would ĞŶŐĂŐĞƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂĚǀĞƌƐŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚ
await[ed] [the applicant] in St Kitts [would] further reduce his already limited life expectancy 
ĂŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚŚŝŵƚŽĂĐƵƚĞŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?102 In N v. UK, however, the Grand 
Chamber foƵŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ǀŝŽůĂƚĞ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? dŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ
distinguished N v. UK from D v. UK ŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĐĂƐĞĚŝĚŶŽƚĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞ ‘ǀĞƌǇ
ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?103.104 While the Court concurred with the applicant that her 
removal would cause her condition to deteriorate and would significantly shorten her life 
expectancy,
105
 ŝƚŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚĞ ǁĂƐŶŽƚ  ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ŝůů ?106 and that she ǁĂƐ  ‘Ĩŝƚ ƚŽ ƚƌĂǀĞů ? ?107 
Significantly, the ECtHR did not deploy the concept of vulnerable group in N. v. UK.
108
  
                                                            
95
 Supra note 30, para. 251. 
96
 Ibid., para. 253. 
97
 WĞƌŽŶŝĂŶĚdŝŵŵĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐĂƐ ‘ŵŝƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?supra note 25, p. 1065). 
98
 E.g., D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, supra note 31 (the Roma community); and 
European Court of Human Rights, Alajos kiss v. Hungary, App. no. 38832/06, Judgment of 20 
May 2010 (persons with mental disabilities). 
99
 L. Peroni, A. Timmer, supra note 25, p. 1065. Peroni and Timmer describe these cases as 
 ‘ŵĂůĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?ibid.). 
100
 E.g., European Court of Human Rights [GC], Salman v. Turkey, App. no. 21986/93, 
Judgment of 27 June 2000.  
101
 E.g., European Court of Human Rights, Bevacqua and S v. Bulgaria, App. no. 71127/01, 
Judgment of 12 June 2008. See Alexandra Timmer, supra note 58, pp. 155-156. 
102
 European Court of Human Rights, D v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 30240/96, Judgment 
of 2 May 1997, paras. 52 and 53. 
103
 Ibid., para. 53. 
104
 Supra note 90, para. 51. 
105
 Ibid., para. 50. 
106
 Ibid. 
European Journal of Health Law 21(4) (2014) 339-364  Accepted Author Manuscript 
    
 
13 
 
 
4.3. Choosing between the M.S.S. Approach and the N v. UK Approach: S.H.H. v. 
the United Kingdom 
The M.S.S. and N v. UK approaches were considered in S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom 
(S.H.H).
109
 As was the case in N v. UK, the applicant was a refused asylum seeker. He claimed 
that his deportation to Afghanistan would breach Article 3 because of the foreseeable 
degradation of his living conditions. He asserted that, without family support, he would be 
left to his own device and would not be able to meet his most basic needs.
110
 He also 
pointed out that his disabilities would put him at an increased risk of violence and further 
injury or death in the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan.
111
 On this basis, the applicant 
ƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘he was plainly a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŐƌŽƵƉŝŶŶĞĞĚŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? and that his application should therefore be 
ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ŝŶM.S.S.112 The ECtHR disagreed with the 
applicant; the Court held that his situation ought to be distinguished from that of the 
applicant in M.S.S. and that his application should consequently be determined in the light 
ŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚŚĂŵďĞƌ ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŝŶN v. UK.113 dŚĞŽƵƌƚĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ
ĚŝĚŶŽƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇ  ‘ǀĞƌǇĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?114 The ECtHR noted that he had received 
medical treatment and support in Afghanistan. While the Court accepted that the 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ?ďǇ ŚŝƐ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ƚŽ ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ ? ŝƚ
stressed that this fact alone could not be decisive.
115
 On this basis, the ECtHR found that his 
deportation would not breach Article 3.
116
 As was the case in N v. UK, the ECtHR did not use 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉ ?/ƉŽƐŝƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƚŚƌĞĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚ,Z ?Ɛ
deployment of the concept of vulnerable group in health-related cases is subject to resource 
and immigration control considerations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
107
 Ibid., para. 47.  
108
 /ŶĂƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚ,ZŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŝǀŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ,/s ?ǁĞƌĞ ?Ă
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉǁŝƚŚĂŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŶĚƐƚŝŐŵĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵƌƚŽĨ,ƵŵĂŶ
Rights, Kiyutin v. Russia, App. no. 2700/10, Judgment of 10 March 2011, para. 64). On this 
basis, the Court found that denying the applicant a residence permit on the ground that he 
was HIV-positive breached his Article 8 and Article 14 rights (ibid., para. 74). Importantly, 
ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛjudgment did not place socio-economic obligations on the respondent state. 
109
 European Court of Human Rights, S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 60367/10, 
Judgment of 29 January 2013. 
110
 Ibid., para. 57. 
111
 Ibid., para. 56. 
112
 Ibid., para. 57. 
113
 Ibid., para. 89. 
114
 Ibid., para. 95. 
115
 Ibid., para.93.  
116
 Ibid., para.95. 
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It is well-ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞConvention may apply to socio-
economic conditions and give rise to socio-economic obligations.
117
 Accordingly, the Court 
has, for example, ĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐǁŝƚŚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞŵĞĚŝĐĂů
assistance breaches Article 3 when the ensuing harm attains the requisite severity 
threshold.
118
 The Court has also accepted that health care standards in ECHR states may 
beget complaints under Article 2
119
 and that Article 8 can give rise to obligations in the field 
of health care.
120
 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞƚ,ZƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇŚĞƐŝƚĂŶƚĂďŽƵƚ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ
Convention a positive obligation to provide hĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ?ďĞǇŽŶĚǁŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ
extreme circumstances.
121
 Importantly, the ECtHR iƐ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ  ‘ŝŵƉŽƐĞ ĂŶ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŽƌĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞďƵƌĚĞŶ ?ŽŶstates122 and, for this reason, limits the breadth 
of ECHR positive obligations in the socio-economic domain. The ECtHR has repeatedly held 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƐŽĐŝŽ-economic rights, including the right 
to charge-free dwelling, the right to work, the right to free medical assistance, or the right 
ƚŽĐůĂŝŵĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵĂ^ƚĂƚĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůĞǀĞůŽĨůŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?123  
 
In health-related cases involving irregular migrants, concerns over resources are closely 
intertwined with immigration control considerations, which further restrict the range of 
socio-economic obligations that the ECtHR is willing to place on states. Critically, in N v. UK, 
the Grand Chamber stressed that  ‘ ?Ă ?ĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶŵĞĚŝĐĂů ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
economic differences between countries, entail[ed] that the level of treatment available in 
                                                            
117
 Airey v. Ireland, supra note 11, para 26. dŚŝƐŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ
approach to interpretation (V. Mantouvalou,  “N v UK: no duty to rescue the nearby 
needy? ? ? 72(5) (2009) Modern Law Review 815-828, p.  820). 
118
 For example, in Keenan v. the United Kingdom, the Court found that the lack of adequate 
medical treatment for a prisoner suffering from schizophrenia amounted to degrading 
treatment (European Court of Human Rights, Keenan v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 
27229/95, Judgment of 3 April 2001, para. 116). 
119
 E.g., European Court of Human Rights, Nitecki v. Poland, App. no. 65653/01, Decision on 
Admissibility of 21 March 2002; European Court of Human Rights, Pentiacova and Others v. 
Moldova, App. no. 14462/03, Decision on admissibility of 4 January 2005; and LCB v. the 
United Kingdom, App. no. 23413/94, Judgment of 9 June 1998, para. 36.  
120
 E.g., Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, supra note 119. The ECtHR found the Article 8 
complaint to be manifestly ill-founded (ibid.). 
121
 >ƵŬĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ůĂŶ^ŝŵŵŽŶƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵƌƚŽĨ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ ?^ǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐhŶĞĂƐĞ ? ?
in: Malcolm Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International 
and Comparative Law (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne/Madrid/Cape Town/Singapore/São 
Paolo/Delhi/Tokyo/Mexico City: Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp. 409-427, p. 418. 
122
 European Court of Human Rights, Kontrová v. Slovakia, App. no. 7510/04, Judgment of 31 
May, para. 50, citing: European Court of Human Rights, Osman v. the United Kingdom, App. 
no. 23452/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998, para. 116. 
123
 European Court of Human Rights, Pancenko v. Latvia, App. no. 40772/98, Decision on 
admissibility of 28 October 1999. See also e.g., European Court of Human Rights, K ?ZŽƵƌŬĞ
v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 39022/97, Decision on admissibility of 26 June 2001; and 
European Court of Human Rights, Botta v. Italy, App. no. 21439/93, Judgment of 24 
February 1998, para. 28. 
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ƚŚĞŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ^ƚĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽĨŽƌŝŐŝŶŵĂǇǀĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇ ? ?124 On this basis, the 
Court held that to find the respondent state in breach of Article 3 would amount to 
requiring sƚĂƚĞƐ  ‘ƚŽ ĂůůĞǀŝĂƚĞ ƐƵĐŚ disparities through the provision of free and unlimited 
health care to all aliens without a right to stay ǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?125 dŚŝƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ǁŽƵůĚƉůĂĐĞ ‘ƚŽŽŐƌĞĂƚĂďƵƌĚĞŶŽŶŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?126  
 
I contend that resource and immigration control considerations have a significant bearing 
on ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ. They explain why the applicant in M.S.S. was 
ĚĞĞŵĞĚ  ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ŝŶN v. UK and S.H.H. were considered 
 ‘ŝŶǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ? ? dǁŽ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƐĞƚ ƚhese applicants apart: their immigration status and the 
source of harm.  The applicant in M.S.S. was an asylum seeker whose claim was still pending 
while the applicants in N v. UK and S.H.H. had been refused asylum and were therefore 
categorised as irregular migrants.
127
 In M.S.S., the risk of harm arose from  ‘deliberate 
actions or omissions ? of the authorities128 while, in N v. UK and S.H.H., the risk of harm 
stemmed from a lack of adequate resources in the receiving country. In my view, the 
ƚ,Z ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶN v. UK and its decision to apply this approach in S.H.H. clearly show 
that the Court is concerned with containing the development of socio-economic obligations 
in health-related cases concerning irregular migrants. I posit that these concerns are central 
ƚŽƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽĚĞƉůŽǇƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉŝŶN v. UK and S.H.H.  
 
Timmer observes that, ŝŶ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ?  ‘ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ǁĞŝŐŚƐ ŚĞĂǀŝůǇ ĂŶĚ ĐĂŶ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶ
ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌŝŶŐ ĨŽƌĐĞ ? ŝŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŵĞĞƚƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞ ƐĞǀĞƌŝƚǇ
threshold.
129
 For example, in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki v. Belgium (Mubilanzila), one 
of the appliĐĂŶƚƐ ? ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?as a very young unaccompanied irregular 
migrant was critical to the ECtHR ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ Ă ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ?130 The applicants, a 
mother and daughter, successfully ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
deportation to the DRC violated, inter alia, their Articles 3 rights.
131
 The Court emphasised 
that, given the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3, it took precedence 
                                                            
124
 Supra note 90, para. 44. 
125
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 dŚĞƚĞƌŵŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŵŝŐƌĂŶƚŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƌĞůĞĂƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐŝƚƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ
in S.H.H. (European Court of Human Rights. A Disabled Asylum Seeker failed to Prove that his 
Removal would Expose him to Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, Press Release, ECHR 034 
(2013), 29 January 2013). 
128
 Supra note 30, para. 250. In Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR applied the 
M.S.S. approach rather than the N v. UK approach because the risk of harm could be 
attributed to the deliberate actions or omissions of the authorities (European Court of 
Human Rights, Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 8319/07 and 11449/07, 
Judgment of 28 June 2011, para. 282-283).  The Court found that, in the absence of an 
internal relocation alternative, both applicants were at risk of treatment contrary to Article 
3 if returned to Somalia (ibid., paras 284-292).   
129
 Alexandra Timmer, supra note 58, p. 164. 
130
 European Court of Human Rights, Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki v. Belgium, App. no. 
13178/03, Judgment of 12 October 2006,  para. 55. 
131
 Ibid., paras.  59, 63 and 71. 
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over immigration control considerations.
132
 While I concur with Timmer that vulnerability 
can have a significant bearing on ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐArticle 3 assessments, I contend that a more 
balanced account of its potency must be offered. Significantly, and in stark contrast with the 
ƚ,Z ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶMubilanzila, it is the ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶthat prevails 
ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ECHR obligations in N v. UK, with the consequence that the fundamental 
nature of Article 3 is eroded. In N v. UK, the Court increases the requisite Article 3 severity 
threshold
133
 ĂŶĚďĂůĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽ ŝůů-treatment against 
societal interests, notwithstanding the absolute nature of this provision.
134
 Paradoxically, 
while the ECtHR does not use the concept of vulnerable group, it (implicitly) balances 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ PƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƐĞƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
national community, the national health care system, and the sovereign state. I further posit 
that the importance that the ECtHR attaches to the applicant ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŝŶM.S.S. must 
ďĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?hĂƐǇůƵŵůĂǁŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ
both Greece and Belgium were legally bound under EU law to provide asylum seekers with 
minimum reception standards is critical to thĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĂŶƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ?135 The 
significance that the ECtHR accords to the existence of EU obligations is apparent in S.H.H. 
The Court stressed that the case concerned the living conditions in a state (Afghanistan) that 
had no legally binding obligation to provide asylum seekers with minimum living 
standards.
136
 Thus, in my opinion, the impact of the M.S.S. approach on the extent of the 
socio-economic dimension of the ECHR must not be overstated and I strongly disagree with 
:ƵĚŐĞ ^Ăũſ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ that this approach brings the ECtHR close to imposing an obligation to 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ?ƐďĂƐŝĐŶĞĞĚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?137  
 
In my view, the N v. UK and M.S.S. ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƌĞǀĞĂůƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞ
socio-economic dimension of the ECHR in respect of migrants with precarious immigration 
statuses. Having shown that the ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐ ƚŽ ďƌŝŶŐ
irregular migrants  under the protection of the ECHR in health-related cases, I seek to 
explore whether the deployment of a vulnerability analysis in the Court ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ Đan 
contribute to improving protection standards for these migrants. 
                                                            
132
 Ibid., para. 55.  
133
 In Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, some of the judges expressed the view that the 
 ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐĞǀĞƌŝƚǇƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ Wto be close to dying [applied in N v. UK] - could not be easily 
reconciled with the letter and spirit of Article 3 (European Court of Human Rights, Yoh-Ekale 
Mwanje v. Belgium, App. no. 10486/10, Judgment of 20 December 2011, Partly Concurring 
KƉŝŶŝŽŶŽĨ:ƵĚŐĞƐdƵůŬĞŶƐ ?:ŽēŝĞŶĦ ?WŽƉŽǀŝđ ?<ĂƌĂŬĂƔ ?Zaimondi and Pinto De Albuquerque, 
para. 6). Regrettably, the Court adopted the same approach as in N v. UK, notwithstanding 
these judges ?ŵisgivings. They ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚŚĂŵďĞƌ ?Ɛ
approach in N v the United Kingdom sought to preserve  ‘ůĞŐĂůĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?ibid.).  
134
 Yet it is well-ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŶŽŶ-refoulement cases, that 
Article 3 rights cannot be balanced against societal interests, no matter how legitimate 
these may be (e.g., European Court of Human Rights [GC], Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 
App. no. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996, para. 79). 
135
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers. 
136
 Supra note 109, para. 90. 
137
 Supra note 30, Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajó.  
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5. dŚĞĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂsƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐĂƐĞ>aw 
Drawing on the work of Turner and Fineman, I have established that vulnerability can be 
conceptualised as a foundation and tool of IHRL. In my view, such a development makes 
IHRL more responsive to lived vulnerability and as such helps remedy the exclusionary 
dimension of IHRL. I have also shoǁŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŐƌŽƵƉĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚstruggles 
to bring irregular migrants under the protection of the ECHR in health-related cases. With 
this in mind, I posit that a vulnerability analysis provides the ECtHR with a potent tool to 
increase protection standards for irregular migrants in the field of health.  
5.1. The Vulnerable Subject as the ECHR Subject 
A vulnerability analysis requires, in the first place, that the ECtHR affirms the vulnerable 
human subject as the ECHR subject, albeit within the confines of Article 1.
138
 To date, the 
ECHR subject is modelled on the IHRL subject and as such is anchored in the liberal tradition. 
For this reason, the ECHR subject is not inherently vulnerable. Timmer emphasises that the 
ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ  Wand this is the case of asylum seekers - ĂƌĞ  ‘ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŽĨ
marginalized and stigmatized subjects: they do not function as an alternative to the liberal 
subject, but are classic examples of liďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛ  “KƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?139 Because the Court does not 
challenge the myth of the liberal invulnerable subject, its case law contributes to the 
marginalisation of the very groups it seeks to protect. Importantly, the ƚ,Z ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ
in M.S.S. and N v. UK reveal that the Court ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŵƵƐƚĞŶũŽǇƐŽŵĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨ
membership in the respondent state, albeit minimal in the case of asylum seekers. Because 
their immigration status locates them outside the national community, irregular migrants 
are not regarded as vulnerable subjectƐ ?&ŽƌƚŚŝƐƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ
group cannot capture ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŝŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚ-
related cases. The recognition of the vulnerable subject as the ECHR subject demands that 
ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ƌĞĂƐƐĞƐƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ for the 
purpose of affording protection in the field of health. This, in turn, requires that the Court 
ƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?  
                                                            
138
 Paradoxically, while the ECHR compares favourably with the European Social Charter (in 
its original and revised form) in that it clearly bestows rights on irregular migrants present in 
ECHR States, the European Committee of Social Rights has proved more willing to extend 
protections to this group. The Social Charter (in its original and revised form) provides that 
rights ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶĨĞƌƌĞĚ ŽŶ  ‘ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞƌƐ ŽŶůǇ ŝŶ ƐŽ ĨĂƌ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌ WĂƌƚŝĞƐ
ůĂǁĨƵůůǇƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽƌǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Social Charter, CETS No. 35, 18 October 1961, entry into force 26 February 1965, Appendix, 
point 1; Revised European Social Charter, CETS No. 163, 3 may 1996, entry into force 1 July 
1999, Appendix, point 1). The European Committee of Social Rights has nonetheless brought 
irregular migrants under the protection of the Social Charter, albeit within limits, on the 
ďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞŚĂƌƚĞƌŵƵƐƚďĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚƐŽĂƐƚŽŐŝǀĞ ůŝĨĞĂŶĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ŵƵƐƚ  ‘ďĞ ƌĞĂĚ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?  ?International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France, supra note 57, para. 29). See also 
Defence for Children International (DCI) v The Netherlands (ibid.). 
139
 Alexandra Timmer, supra note 58, p. 162.  
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5.2. sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ /ƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ DŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ,ĞĂůƚŚ-
Related Claims  
/ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ĨƵůůǇ  ‘ĚŝƐĂďůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ
power and make immigration status totally irrelevant to ECHR protection in the field of 
health. However, I have shown that a vulnerability analysis can nonetheless help close 
protection gaps in the international human rights regime. On this basis, I argue that the 
development of a vulnerability analysis in the ECtHR ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ can advance protection 
standards for irregular migrants in the field of health. Importantly, because a vulnerability 
analysis recognises irregular migrants as fully-fledged ECHR subjects, their claims to 
protection and therefore to resources are no longer systematically set against those of 
 ?ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?. It follows that a vulnerability analysis can firmly 
entrench the fundamental nature of Article 3 and consequently compel the ECtHR to 
reconsider its approach in N v. UK. I have pointed out that this approach rests on troubling 
distinctions based on ƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶstatus, the source of harm, and the nature 
of the claim, which have caused the ECtHR to depart from well-established ECHR principles. 
Elsewhere I have shown that, in addition to undermining the fundamental nature of Article 
3, the N v. UK approach retreats ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ?
contrary to its well-ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĐĂƐĞůĂǁ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?,ZŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
control immigration.
140
 Significantly, the N v. UK ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ŽďůŝǀŝŽƵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?Ɛ
vulnerabilities. I posit that ĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ,ZƐƵďũĞĐƚĂƚ
ŝƚƐĐŽƌĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚƉĞƌŵŝƚƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚŽĨŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ- understood as 
both universal and particular  W ǁŽƵůĚ ?ĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ďĞĨĂĐƚŽƌĞĚ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƚ,Z ‘Ɛ
assessments of ECHR breaches.  This of course would not carry a violation finding in all 
instances. 
Because a vulnerability analysis is concerned with making the ECHR subject more resilient to 
her vulnerabilities, it offers a tool for investigating the staƚĞ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?vulnerabilities and the complexities of global migration. Paradoxically, in 
N v. UK, the ECtHR makes ƚŚĞ ‘ĨůŽŽĚŐĂƚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽŝƚƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?141 yet the Court 
does not attempt to explore this argument and simply endorses receiving ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ
welfare provision encourages irregular migration and as such places an undue burden on 
national resources.
142 ? ƌƵĐŝĂůůǇ ? Ă ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ
choices be scrutinised in the light of their human rights obligations. This would mark a 
                                                            
140
 Sylvie Da Lomba,  “dŚĞ ,Z ? ,ĞĂůƚŚ ĂƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ /ƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ DŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ? ŝŶ PM. Freeman, S. 
Hawkes and B. Bennett (eds.), Law and Global Health: Current Legal Issues Volume 16 
(Oxford: OUP, 2014) pp. 149-164. 
141
 dŚĞ  ‘ĨůŽŽĚŐĂƚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ƌĞƐƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĞůĨĂƌĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂĐƚƐĂƐĂƉƵůů
factor for irregular migration. It is commonly used by governments to justify curtailments of 
welfare provision for irregular migrants, (S. Da Lomba, supra note 4, pp. 9-10). 
142
 The dissenting judges pointed out that the majority were concerned that finding the UK 
ŝŶ ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ?  ‘ǁŽƵůĚ ŽƉĞŶ ƵƉ ƚŚĞ ĨůŽŽĚŐĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵĂŬĞ
ƵƌŽƉĞǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ƐŝĐŬ-ďĂǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ?supra note 90, Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann, para. 8). The dissenting judges further 
observed that  ‘when one compares the total number of requests received (and those 
refused and accepted) as against the number of HIV cases, the so-called  “floodgate ?
argument is totally misconceived ? (ibid.). 
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significant shift in the way the ECtHR assesses health-related and, more broadly, social 
claims. Indeed, the Court holds the view that states are better placed to make assessments 
regarding the prioritisation and distribution of resources and, for this reason, exercises 
minimum scrutiny ŽǀĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ.143 In Connors v. the United Kingdom, the 
ŽƵƌƚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝŶƐƉŚĞƌĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉůĂǇ ?ĞĚ ?ĂĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞ
ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ?ŝƚǁ ?ŽƵůĚ ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĂƐ
to what [wa]s in the general interest unless that judgment [wa]s manifestly without 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?144 Moreover, the Court has constantly held that states enjoy a very 
ǁŝĚĞ ŵĂƌŐŝŶ ŽĨ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀ ?ŝŶŐ ? ĂŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?
priorities in the context of the allocation of limited resŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ?145 dŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ
supports the idea that supra-national human rights bodies lack the necessary expertise and 
legitimacy to adjudicate social claims. Yet, as >ĂŶŐĨŽƌĚƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚ ? ŝĨ ũƵĚŐĞƐ ?ƌŽůĞ  ‘is not to 
decide policy and resource allocation but rather to assess whether ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ  ? Q ? ŚĂ ?Ɛ ?
ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇ ĐŽŵƉůŝĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ  ?ŝƚƐ ? ůĞŐĂů ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞǇ ŶĞĞĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ  “ƉŽůŝĐǇ ǁŽŶŬƐ ? ?
What is required is essentially the exercise of  “traditional ? ũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?146 Besides, 
 ‘ǁŚĞŶ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ůĂĐŬ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ũƵĚŐĞƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĐĂŶ ŚĞĂƌ ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?
ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ? ?147 Moreover, greater scrutiny of sƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇĐŚŽŝĐĞƐĐĂŶŚĞůƉƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ‘ĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞ
ŽĨũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚƵƌŶĨŽƐƚĞƌƐgovernment accountability and legitimacy.148  
 
Timmer observes that the concept of vulnerability is not without risks for the ECtHR; she 
ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ǀĞƌǇ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ unwanted people 
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 Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, supra note 119. 
144
 European Court of Human Rights, Connors v. the United Kingdom, App. no. 66746/01, 
Judgment of 27 May 2004, para. 82. 
145
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ƌĞŶĚĞƌƐƚŚĞŽƵƌƚǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞĂŶĚƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?149 I agree with Timmer that the Court is 
vulnerable
150
 and I do not dispute that setting protection standards in the social sphere 
when national resources are limited and levels of welfare provision varied across ECHR 
states present the ECtHR with difficult challenges.
151
 However, I take issue with the idea that 
ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐ ƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůǇ ƐĞƚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ĨŝŶĚ
themselves at the outer margins of human rights protections. On the contrary, I posit that 
ůŽǁĞƌŝŶŐƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞĂŶd unwanted ?Ɖoses a greater 
risk for the ECtHR and the whole ECHR system. Crucially, the N v. UK approach caused the 
Court to erode the fundamental and absolute nature of Article 3, a cornerstone of the ECHR 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?WĂůŵĞƌƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞn put on the special responsibilities and 
expectations that are placed on international courts and monitoring bodies in developing 
the content of socio-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?152 /ĐŽŶĐƵƌǁŝƚŚWĂůŵĞƌƚŚĂƚĂŽƵƌƚŽĨ ‘ƐƵĐŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
ĂƐƚŚĞƚ,Z ?ŚĂƐa critical part to play in developing the socio-economic dimension of the 
ECHR, notwithstanding the institutional difficulties that the identification of socio-economic 
obligations entail.
153
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, I have shown ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨĂǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƚ,Z ?Ɛ
case law can improve protection standards for irregular migrants in the field of health. This 
is because a vulnerability analysis can support their claims to health resources as ECHR 
subjects. I accept that the development of a vulnerability analysis would signify a radical 
change in the ECHR system in that it eschews the traditional liberal subject and upholds the 
vulnerable subject as the ECHR subject. In addition to fundamentally transforming the 
nature of the ECHR subject, a vulnerability analysis would profoundly alter the way the 
ƚ,Z ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞƐ ŝƌƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? ƐŽĐŝŽ-economic claims. First, the Court would have to 
reassess the significance of ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞ ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ the purpose of 
affording protection in the field of health. Secondly, the Court would be expected to explore 
how immigration laws and policies can create or perpetuate disadvantage. Finally, a 
vulnerability analysis would call for greater Court ?Ɛ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ŽĨ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
allocation of resources in the light of their ECHR obligations.  
ImportantůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚ,Z ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ůĂǁ ŚĂƐ
significance beyond the protection of irregular migrants in the field of health.  The aim of a 
vulnerability analysis is to make the ECHR more responsive to the vulnerabilities of all ECHR 
subjects in all spheres of life.
154
 This, in turn, requires that the ECtHR recognises the deep 
link that exists between their vulnerabilities and ECHR rights as well as fully accepts that the 
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Convention can give rise to socio-economic obligations. The affirmation of the socio-
economic dimension of the ECHR is therefore central to the development of a vulnerability 
analysis.  
dŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶM.S.S. was strongly criticised for overstretching the ECHR socio-
economic obligations and for profoundly altering the nature of the Convention.
155
 However, 
ŝŶŵǇǀŝĞǁ ? ƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ,Z ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŐŝǀĞ ƌŝƐĞ ƚŽƐŽĐŝŽ-economic 
obligations. For example, the range of health-related obligations that the Convention may 
beget cannot be as extensive as the obligations arising from Article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which enshrines the right to health.
156
 I 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ďĞŝŶŐ ĚĞƉůŽƌĞĚ ? ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,Z ?Ɛ ƐŽĐŝŽ-
economic domain should be construed as an affirmation of the interrelated, interdependent 
and indivisible nature of human rights.
157
 As the ECtHR emphasised in Airey v. Ireland, there 
can be  ‘no water-tight division ?between social and economic rights and civil and political 
rights.
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